In recognition of November being World Vegan Month.
Increasingly, companies are growing to understand and engage with the multiple benefits that a healthy diet such as veganism can bring to their businesses. Big names endorsing the practice of abstaining from the use of animal products include IBM, Qualcomm, PwC, Caterpillar, General Electric, Volkswagen, Google, Facebook and Dropbox, all of whom have embraced employee-led vegan initiatives in their workplaces with positive results.
Companies report that the greatest benefit is the improved health and wellbeing of their employees. Veganism has been linked to lower BMI, blood pressure and cholesterol, all of which reduce the risks of cardiovascular disease, cancer and Type Two Diabetes among other damaging or potentially fatal diseases.
The practice has also been shown to have a positive impact on mental health through improved mood and reduced anxiety because of the absence of arachidonic acid in a meat-free diet. Arachidonic acid is an inflammatory omega-6 fatty acid found in animal products.
The improved physical and mental health of employees has wide-ranging benefits for businesses. These include a reduced number of sick days, increased productivity and lower insurance and health care expenses, all of which cut company costs and increase profitability.
The focus on wellbeing goes beyond the bottom line; increasingly potential employees and clients are attracted to businesses that follow inclusive, environmentally friendly and sustainable practices. Veganism not only promotes animal welfare, it can also diminish an individual’s carbon footprint by up to 73%. This means a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, which decreases air pollution, a significant contributor to climate change. A reduction in the amount of land used for agricultural purposes would decrease the threat to endangered species of wildlife.
Forward looking firms are those supporting and encouraging these kinds of employee-led initiatives, as they are concurrently helping their employees, their businesses, and the environment.
At JHA we are committed to supporting the wellness of our employees by supporting and encouraging positive diet and lifestyle choices.
Data in this article comes from articles published in the Independent and Forbes.
The Treasury has announced plans to introduce a Digital Services Tax (“DST”) from April 2020, which it anticipates will raise £1.5 billion over four years.
The introduction of the DST reflects the UK’s discontent with the taxation outcome of certain highly digitalised businesses under the current international tax framework. The view is that the DST will act as a short term solution to the tax challenges of digitalisation while a global consensus-based solution is designed and implemented within the EU, G20 and OECD. Due to its interim nature, the DST will be subject to formal review in 2025.
The DST will apply a 2% tax on the revenues of three specific in-scope digital business models: the provision of a search engine, social media platforms, and online marketplaces. The tax has a broad nexus rule focusing on the location of the user, not the business. This means that the DST will apply to the revenues of both resident and non-resident enterprises, irrespective of their level of physical presence in the UK, whenever they are linked to UK users. However, the DST is intended to target large tech companies only. As a result, only large businesses which generate at least £500m from in-scope business models will be subject to the DST.
The stated intention is for the DST to operate outside the scope of tax treaties. This hints at the view that the DST will not (either as matter of form or substance) be designed as a tax on income or any element of income covered by Article 2 (Taxes Covered) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. By operating outside tax treaties, major non-resident tech companies will be unable to credit the DST charge against income tax imposed by their country of residence.
Compliance with EU law will be required if the transition period proposed in the draft Brexit Withdrawal Agreement is agreed upon. In particular, the DST must be compliant with the fundamental freedoms set out in the TFEU and the prohibition on State aid. It should be noted that the CJEU currently has two requests for a preliminary ruling concerning the application of Hungary’s advertisement tax to Google (C-482/18) and Vodafone (C-75/18). Hungary’s advertisement tax is also a unilateral measure aimed at addressing the tax challenges of certain digitalised businesses (online advertising services) and, like the DST, the scope of Hungary’s advertisement tax is also ultimately dependant on the location of the targeted public.
Ongoing controversy continues to surround the “Beautiful Game” as some 70 million documents (3.4 terabytes of data), remain the subject of investigation by journalists from members of European Investigative Collaborations (EIC).
The current report of the investigation relates to possible financial fraud in relation to the Financial Fair Play rule of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). This rule, approved in 2010, aims to prevent professional football clubs from spending more than they earn in the pursuit of success. The aim is to prevent clubs from doing this and then getting into financial difficulties that could endanger their long-term survival.
In December 2016 findings from the first files disclosed how some of football’s most prominent figures, including Cristiano Ronaldo and José Mourinho, avoided tax on some earnings through their use of offshore accounts. Since then, both European and national regulators have been questioning representatives of European football bodies about their tax structures.
The latest information released concentrates on the activities of Middle Eastern individuals and organisations who have become increasingly influential in football. So far they have focused on Manchester City, owned by Sheikh Mansour, deputy-prime minister of the UAE, and Paris St Germain, which belongs to Qatar Sports Investments.
The documents raise questions about the arrangements between these clubs and the football authorities regarding sponsorship deals and Financial Fair Play. They suggest the authorities may have dealt unevenly with the application of the sport’s rules, making it difficult for club owners to navigate these already complex regulations.
The investigators say that they will also be turning the spotlight on tax avoidance arrangements entered into by clubs and players.
JHA is a leading authority in contentious tax and commercial litigation, having achieved Band One rankings in both Legal 500 and Chambers & Partners for the fifth consecutive year. A significant part of its practice is devoted to football-related tax disputes involving clubs, players and agents.
Reports on the investigation can be found in DER SPIEGEL and Reuters.
Article originally published in Civil Justice Quarterly, Volume 37 Issue 4 2018
The Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) permit proceedings against unnamed defendants. This is available where wrongdoers conceal their identities, such as on the internet, or hit and run drivers. Under the Sixth Motor Insurance Directive, compulsory insurance is on the vehicle. The insurers’ responsibility is in respect of civil liabilities of any driver whosoever, including when there is no right of indemnity under the policy. In Cameron v Hussain, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the victim has the number plate, and there is insurance of that vehicle by identified insurers. The case in the Court of Appeal overlooked art.18 of the Directive, which requires a direct right of action for the victim against insurers. The dissenting judgment agreeing with the court below: (1) misinterprets the Directive, the CPR and s.151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, (2) disregards the legislative public policy underlying them, (3) is founded on considerations which are mistaken, and (4) reaches a deeply unsatisfactory result. There should be, and is, a general principle under the CPR that courts will do what they can to allow substantive rights to be determined and enforced. This underlies the established procedures in internet cases and for injunctions. It engages the overriding objective, enabling the courts to do good justice.
Sloane Street is lined with the outlets of retail brands. They own trade marks. They face competition from cheap imitations sold on the internet through web sites with addresses which change. No-one knows who the sellers are, or where they are. Their identity is concealed. No effective injunction can be obtained against them. The imitated brands obtained internet blocking injunctions against BT and other service providers requiring them to block access to identified web sites and addresses to which they migrate. At first instance and in the Court of Appeal the internet service providers resisted the injunctions because they committed no wrong and were entirely innocent. The case went to the Supreme Court on who should pay the expenses of implementing the injunctions.
Injunctions are granted for a purpose. The injunction jurisdiction rests on current policy. The Mareva injunction is a consequence of use of off shore companies, banks accounts and trust structures. The decisions in the time of Queen Victoria which denied Mareva jurisdiction were founded on policy which became out dated and unjust.
The internet blocking injunction is granted against the third parties to protect a copyright or trade mark right, and to promote the due administration of justice when no effective order can be made against the wrongdoer. The expenses of implementing them must be borne by the claimant and not imposed on the innocent party.
The same principles apply to cases, whether about Intellectual Property or not. Injunctions cannot and do not depend on case law on the limits to the jurisdiction exercised by the old High Court of Chancery over disclosure of documents in the time of Charles Dickens. That jurisdiction was not available against the innocent bystander, a mere witness. In Victorian England there was no internet. Times have changed.
The jurisdiction to grant injunctions against innocent bystanders is considered in The Jurisdiction to Grant Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties, published in The European Intellectual Property Review Volume 40 Issue 9 2018 , p 571, Steven Gee QC.
The European Commission has concluded that Luxembourg did not breach EU state aid rules by not taxing certain profits of McDonald’s in that jurisdiction.
The Commission’s investigation, launched in December 2015, focused on whether the non-taxation resulted from a misapplication of national laws as well as the Luxembourg-US Double Taxation Treaty. The Commission sought to establish whether such non-taxation amounted to state aid through illegal tax benefits, whereby McDonald’s was granted an advantage not available to other entities in a comparable situation.
McDonald’s Europe Franchising had not paid any corporate tax in Luxembourg since 2009, whilst recording substantial profits in that period, for instance in excess of €250 million in 2013. The profits originated from franchise royalties in Europe and Russia for the use of the McDonald’s brand and related services. These royalties were directed internally to McDonald’s US branch. The Luxembourg authorities held in 2009 that McDonald’s Europe Franchising did not owe any corporate tax in that jurisdiction, since the profits were due to be taxed in the US according to the Luxembourg-US Double Taxation Treaty. However, the profits were in fact not subject to taxation in the US as McDonald’s Europe Franchising was not a ‘permanent establishment’ and thus did not have a taxable presence in the US under US law. At the same time, the Luxembourg authorities viewed the US branch as a ‘permanent establishment’ and thus the place where most of the profits should be taxed under Luxembourg law. This conclusion led to the double non-taxation of the relevant profits in Luxembourg and the US.
The Commission concluded that the Luxembourg authorities had been correct in exempting McDonald’s US branch, since that branch was indeed a ‘permanent establishment’ under the Luxembourg tax code. That the Luxembourg authorities knew the US branch was simultaneously exempt from tax under US law when they decided not to tax that branch under Luxembourg law did not constitute illegal state aid. However, to prevent such double non-taxation in the future, Luxembourg has now drafted amendments to its tax code which are being discussed in the national parliament. The legislative proposals aim to tighten the rules on determining the existence of a permanent establishment, as well as requiring companies claiming to have a taxable presence abroad to submit confirmation that they are indeed subject to taxation in the other country.
Causation in a contractual dispute is governed by application of the contract. In law context is everything. These principles were of central importance to the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Navigators Insurance Co Ltd v Atlasnavios-Navegacao Lda (The B Atlantic) [2018] 2 WLR 1671. Persons unknown, probably associated with a drugs gang attached three bags of cocaine weighing 132 kg to the hull of the B Atlantic in Venezuela which was loading a cargo of coal for Italy. The drugs were discovered, the vessel detained and this led to the master and the chief officer being convicted by a local jury and sent to prison for 9 years, when they were innocent. This miscarriage also resulted in the confiscation of the vessel. The shipowners who had lost their vessel through no fault of their own or the crew, claimed on the War Risks Policy, which incorporated the Institute War and Strikes Clauses Hulls—Time (1/10/83):
“1. PERILS
Subject always to the exclusions hereinafter referred to, this insurance covers loss of or damage
to the vessel caused by
…
1.2 capture seizure arrest restraint or detainment, and the consequences thereof or any attempt
thereat
…
1.5 any terrorist or any person acting maliciously or from a political motive
1.6 confiscation or expropriation.
…
3. DETAINMENT
In the event that the Vessel shall have been the subject of capture seizure arrest restraint detainment
confiscation or expropriation, and the Assured shall thereby have lost the free use and disposal of the
Vessel for a continuous period of [6] months then for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Vessel
is a constructive total loss the Assured shall be deemed to have been deprived of the possession of
the Vessel without any likelihood of recovery ….
4. EXCLUSIONS
This insurance excludes
4.1 loss damage liability or expense arising from
…
4.1.5 arrest restraint detainment confiscation or expropriation … by reason of infringement of any customs or trading regulations
…”
These are standard terms used internationally which were the product of the reform by Lloyd’s of its marine insurance forms in 1983, using words from the earlier forms. The problem for the shipowners was the Exclusion. The case law, on the basis of which the parties are taken to have contracted, established that infringement of customs regulations included smuggling. The shipowners asserted that the persons unknown were persons “acting maliciously” and that the detention and confiscation of the vessel was not “by reason of….[the] infringement…”, it was caused by the malicious act .
In the lower courts it had been common ground that the persons unknown acted “maliciously”. Arnould on Marine Insurance (18th edition, 2013) stated its opinion that spite or ill will against the shipowners or their ship was not required.
The Supreme Court dismissed the owners’ claim holding: (1) contrary to the concession made by the insurers before the trial judge and Arnould’s opinion, that “maliciously” was governed by precedent decided nearly 50 years ago, deciding in this context that spite or ill will against owners or the vessel was required, that the Supreme Court should decide the case on the correct meaning, and that there was no malice by the drug smugglers, only the desire to make a profit out of smuggling; and (2) the loss arose from detention and confiscation of the vessel. Either was sufficient to decide the case, and so shipowners were not prejudiced by the Supreme Court disregarding the concession. It was important for the international insurance market that the correct meaning was applied.
On (1) textbook writers do not have the benefit of adversarial argument and can make mistakes. In this case the editors had misunderstood what had been decided by the case law. On (2), the causation issue had to be determined giving proper contractual scope and effect to the Exclusion, and not so as to disregard or emasculate it. What is insured against is given by the Perils and the Exclusions, read together.
The consequence is that a shipowner if he wants cover if his ship is lost because of a third party smuggling, will need special words to do this. Smuggling by the crew is covered under the Hull Policy as barratry, a wrongful act wilfully committed by the master or crew to the prejudice of the owner.
Shipowners had a labyrinth of points which were, or could have been, deployed. These are examined in “Smuggling,Marine Insurance, Causation and Interpretation” [2018] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Quarterly 482 (Steven Gee QC).
The UK government is reportedly prepared to resist the European Commission’s challenge in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) over the UK’s VAT treatment of commodity derivatives trading.
The Commission has issued a formal notice of infraction proceedings (dated 8 March 2018) as well as a reasoned opinion (dated 19 July 2018) to the UK. Both communications are pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and concern Article 394 of Directive 2006/112/EC (the VAT Directive) on derogations related to certain commodity derivatives trading under the Terminal Markets Order 1973. This Order is a statutory instrument that permits for exchange-traded derivative transactions in spots, futures and options on commodity contracts to be zero-rated for UK VAT. The zero-rating of these transactions is a permitted special measure under Article 394, which allows Member States to simplify VAT collecting rules. The Commission takes the view that the development of the UK’s zero-rating treatment of such transactions now contravenes EU VAT rules, and requests that the relevant UK VAT rules should be aligned with EU rules.
The March formal notice referred to the UK’s extension of the scope of a VAT derogation that consists of zero-rating transactions carried out on a number of commodity markets. The Commission contends that since the UK notified that derogation to the Commission in 1977, the UK has considerably extended the scope of the measure, which is no longer limited to trading in the commodities originally covered by the derogation. The Commission further holds that the extension of the scope of such a ‘standstill’ derogation is not permitted under EU law. The Commission adds that the derogation is also generating ‘major distortions of competition to the detriment of other financial markets within the EU’, following some informal complaints from other Member States.
As the UK did not act within the stipulated two months since the date of the formal notice, in line with procedure the Commission has now sent a reasoned opinion to the UK government. For the time being and pending any legislative changes, the UK’s tax treatment of commodity derivatives remains as before. However, if the Commission considers the UK’s response to its communications to be insufficient, it can bring the matter before the CJEU.
Justice Secretary David Gauke is reportedly set to launch a consultation on reforming English family law to allow for so-called ‘no-fault’ divorces, where neither spouse is being blamed for the breakdown of the marriage.
Calls for an overhaul of the law strengthened after the much publicised case of Owens v Owens [2018] UKSC 41 (25 July 2018), where the husband opposed his wife’s divorce petition. Owens went all the way to the Supreme Court, where it was held that the examples of the husband’s alleged unreasonable behaviour relied on were not sufficient to satisfy the test in s. 1(2)(b) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, namely ‘that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent’. In English law, the grounds for divorce are limited to adultery, desertion or unreasonable behaviour. Spouses can also divorce if they have been separated for more than two years and both are in agreement, or for more than five years if either contests the petition.
Both Lord Wilson (delivering the majority judgment) and Lady Hale (delivering one of two concurring minority judgments) expressed significant unease at the outcome of the case, but felt bound to uphold the husband’s argument on the basis of the law as it currently stands. In particular, the behaviour referred to by Mrs Owens consisted of a number of alleged incidents which on Mrs Owens’ case, while individually minor, when viewed together indicated‘authoritarian, demeaning and humiliating conduct‘. Based on a correct interpretation of the relevant subsection, the court concluded that Mr Owens’ alleged behaviour did not constitute unreasonable behaviour. While contested final hearings for divorce petitions are few and far between – as Lord Wilson remarked, only 0.015% of the petitions filed in 2016 proceeded to a final, contested hearing – as a result of the Court’s decision, Mrs Owens now has to wait until 2020 to reapply for divorce on the basis of what will then have been five years’ separation.
There is, fortunately, a glint of a silver lining. Lord Wilson noted in his judgment that ‘Parliament may wish to consider whether to replace a law which denies to Mrs Owens any present entitlement to a divorce in the above circumstances’, which is something that it will now be doing. Baroness Butler-Sloss introduced the Divorce (etc.) Law Reform Bill (a Private Member’s Bill) to the House of Lords in July, urging a review of the law on divorce and civil partnership dissolution. The Bill is a result of the research of Professor Liz Trinder from the University of Exeter Law School, published by the Nuffield Foundation, which argues that the current law creates needless conflict between spouses that can negatively impact on children. The Bill will now proceed to the second reading in the House of Lords and is supported by a considerable number of family practitioners. It remains to be seen if the proposals come to fruition.
Whether a claimant has to name a defendant, even when they cannot do so, has become of great importance. Cases include wrongdoers who commit fraud and other wrongs whilst concealing their identities using the internet, injunction cases in which wrongdoers cannot be identified, and hit and run drivers. Any civilised society has to allow the possibility of court claims against persons who cannot be named. English Law now allows this through the first rule in its Civil Procedure Rules, the “overriding objective”.
On 28th November 2018 the Supreme Court is to hear the appeal by the insurers from Cameron v Hussain [2018] 1 W.L.R. 657, a hit and run case, which will be the first case on unnamed defendants to reach the highest court.In 2015 there were 17,000 cases in Great Britain involving hit and run drivers with serious injuries in 9% and some deaths. The system of compulsory motor insurance throughout Europe requires an insurer of a vehicle to pay victims. Provided the victim gets the number plate the insurers can be identified from a register. If the insurers do not pay the Sixth Motor Insurance Directive requires Member States to provide a direct right of action against them. This applies regardless of who was driving the vehicle and regardless of what lies may have been told to get the insurance. It includes a thief. There is a safety net for cases where there was no insurance or the victim is unable to identify the insurers. In the UK this is provided by the Motor Insurance Bureau.
The victim’s car was in a hit and run collision. The insurance policy was with a fictitious insured. Drivers who are not insured have more motive not to stop. She had the number plate of the perpetrator’s vehicle and sued the registered keeper. The police had served a notice on him to provide details of who was driving and he was convicted of failing to give information about the driver’s identity. But the insurers applied for summary judgment because they could prove he was not the driver. The victim riposted by asking for permission to sue the unnamed driver, intending to present the judgment to insurers as one they had to satisfy under section 151 of The Road Traffic Act 1988. The District Judge and then the County Court Judge on appeal decided she should not be permitted to do so because insurers could not identify the hit and run driver and claim an indemnity against him. The Court of Appeal by a majority decided to exercise the discretion allowing her to do so.
Article 18 of the Directive, not mentioned in the Court of Appeal judgments, requires Member States to provide a direct right of action against the insurers. It appears only to have been implemented in the UK where the actual driver is covered by the insurance policy. Article 18 is a legislative choice that the insurers are to compensate victims. There is only one exception: when the victim has entered the vehicle as a passenger knowing it was stolen. This is insurance for the benefit of everyone because anyone can be a victim. Insurers can check on who they are being asked to insure and can require adequate premiums across their book of business, to cover their potential liabilities in all eventualities. The victim has no choice.
Steven Gee QC and Christopher Kientzler have written a detailed article on the case which is being published in (2018) 37 Civil Justice Quarterly issue 4 p.413.
