Our Insights

The government has published the responses to the consultation on the proposed minimum claim period for the remittance basis charge for non-UK domiciled individuals.

At Autumn Statement 2014, the government announced it would consult on making the claim to pay the remittance basis charge apply for a minimum of 3 years, so that non-UK domiciled individuals could not easily arrange their tax affairs so as to only pay the charge occasionally. The consultation sought to better understand the reasons why individuals choose not to pay the remittance basis charge consistently from year to year. It also sought views on how a minimum claim period for the charge might apply, but also any alternatives that would also meet the government’s objectives.

Respondents did not support the introduction of a minimum claim period for the remittance basis charge. It was argued that there is very little evidence of individuals actively arranging their affairs to plan around the remittance basis charge and that the fluctuation of income and gains from year to year was more likely to be the reason for an individual opting in and out of paying the charge. It was also considered to be complex and unnecessary because of the scale of the issue. Some responses indicated that if the government wished to take action then there would be greater support for restricting the ability to pay the remittance basis charge for a period of time once an individual chooses not to pay the charge.

As a result of significant reforms to the taxation of non-UK domiciled individuals and the responses to the consultation, the government announced at Summer Budget 2015 that it will not introduce a minimum claim period for the remittance basis charge.

HM Treasury, Summary of responses on minimum claim period consultation, July 2015

The European Commission has opened two formal antitrust investigations into possible abusive behaviour by Qualcomm in the field of baseband chipsets used in consumer electronic devices.

Qualcomm is the world’s largest supplier of baseband chipsets.

The first antitrust investigation focuses on Qualcomm’s conditions related to the supply of certain chipsets that comply with 3G (UMTS) and 4G (LTE) standards and are used to deliver cellular mobile connectivity in smartphones and tablets. In particular, the Commission will investigate whether Qualcomm has granted payments, rebates or other financial incentives to its customers on condition that they purchase all or a significant part of their baseband chipsets requirements from Qualcomm, and whether any such behaviour might hinder the ability of rivals to compete.

The second investigation concerns Qualcomm’s pricing practices with regard to certain chipsets that comply with 3G (UMTS) standards and are used to deliver cellular mobile connectivity. In particular, the Commission will be assessing whether Qualcomm has engaged in “predatory pricing” by selling these chipsets at prices below costs, with the intention of hindering its competition from remaining in the market and competing with Qualcomm.

Press release – Antitrust: Commission opens two formal investigations against chipset supplier Qualcomm, 16 July 2015

The Summer Finance Bill 2015-2016 is now available here.

Summary of the Bill: A Bill to grant certain duties, to alter other duties, and to amend the law relating to the National Debt and the Public Revenue, and to make further provision in connection with finance.

The Court of Appeal ordered that, whatever the outcome of an appeal, costs associated with preparation of the Court of Appeal bundle will not be recoverable if the bundle does not comply with Paragraph 27 of Practice Direction 52C (appeals to the Court of Appeal) of the Civil Procedure Rules.

The appeal raised a question concerning the proper operation of CPR Part 24 (Summary Judgment) in the context of multi-party construction litigation. However, before addressing this question, Lord Justice Jackson made the following comments on the appeal bundle:

• Paragraph 27 of Practice Direction 52C sets out clearly what documents should be included and, more importantly, what documents should not.
• Specifically, paragraph 27 (1) provides that the appeal bundle “must contain only those documents relevant to the appeal”.
• In the present appeal bundle there are numerous duplicates and irrelevant documents. The arrangement of the correspondence is, to put it charitably, chaotic. It is certainly not chronological. Amongst the jumble of correspondence there are copies of superfluous authorities. The brief chronology furnished by the parties does not contain any page references to aid the hapless judge as he/she struggles to piece together the story of what happened.
• The appeal bundle should be an aid to the Court, not an obstacle course. The Practice Direction governing the conduct of appeals is not difficult to understand. It serves a serious purpose. Experienced practitioners should do what it says.
• Consequently, whatever the outcome of the appeal, no party will be entitled to recover any costs referable to the preparation of the bundle.

Lord Justice Tomlinson and Lord Justice Floyd agreed with Lord Justice Jackson and the decision not to award costs for preparing the bundle to either party was held.

In relation to the pivotal question in the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appeal should be allowed as the requirements of CPR 24.2 (grounds for summary judgment) had not been met.

The Honorary Edward Iliffe and Mrs Teleri Iliffe (as Respondents) v Feltham Construction Limited (as Appellant) and others [2015] EWCA Civ 715

Denmark’s implementation notifications under the agreement between itself and the EU on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters have been published in the Official Journal.

According to Article 4 of the Agreement of 19 October 2005 between the EU and Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, whenever implementing measures are adopted, Denmark’s decision on whether or not to implement the content of such measures shall be notified to the Commission.

Denmark has notified the Commission of its decision to implement a number of such measures, following amendments to relevant EU Regulations (notably the Brussels I Regulation).

Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 182/1, 10 July 2015

The Commission has adopted its Annual Report on how it monitors the application of EU law in 2014.

The 32nd Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law reviews Member States’ performance on key aspects of the application of EU law and highlights the main enforcement policy developments of 2014.

The Commission launches infringement procedures when a Member State does not resolve an alleged breach of Union law. The Commission opens infringement procedures when a Member State has not notified the measures transposing a directive into national law within the agreed deadline. The Commission can also open an infringement procedure on the basis of a Commission investigation or a complaint by individual citizens or businesses when a country’s legislation is not in line with the requirements of EU legislation or when Union law is not applied correctly or at all by national authorities.

Overall, the number of formal infringement procedures has decreased in the last five years. The Commission considers that this reflects the effectiveness of the structured dialogue with Member States via EU Pilot before a formal infringement procedure is launched. The Commission has stated that it also reflects the Commission’s determination to work with the Member States in improving compliance at an early stage and resolving potential infringements quickly, to the benefit of citizens and businesses.

As in 2013, environment, transport and internal market and services remain the policy areas in which most infringement cases were open in 2014.

Report on 2014 infringements: Commission enforces correct implementation of EU law (press release)

Report from the Commission: Monitoring the application of Union law – 2014 Annual Report, 9 July 2015

The Supreme Court has provided a valuable discussion of the differences between the principle and tests of proportionality in ECHR and EU law.

The case concerned a EU law challenge brought by barristers to the UK’s Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates (QASA), which required criminal barristers to be judicially assessed before they may accept certain categories of cases. The appellants sought judicial review of the bringing into effect of QASA, alleging that it was contrary to the Provision of Services Regulations 2009. This SI (and the Directive it implemented, 2006/123/EC) stated that authorisations schemes had to satisfy two conditions: the need was justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest, and the objective pursued could not be attained by a less restrictive measure.

The Supreme Court held as follows:

• EU proportionality was different from ECHR proportionality. The latter involved a four-stage analysis explained in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 (in brief, importance of the objective, rationality, availability of a less intrusive alternative and proportionality). This analysis was not applicable to proportionality in EU law.
• By contrast, EU proportionality was now enshrined in Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union: “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”.
• In EU law proportionality may arise in a number of circumstances, principally:
  • as a ground of review of EU measures themselves (i.e. in cases before the CJEU). Here, a court would only intervene if it considered the measure manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued.
  • in reviews of national measures relying on derogations from general EU rights (mainly fundamental freedoms), where proportionality functioned as a means of preventing disguised discrimination and unnecessary barriers to market integration, and was therefore applied more strictly. Here, the measures should be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest, be suitable for the objective pursued, and not go beyond what was necessary to attain it.
  • in reviews of national measures which did not threaten the integration of the internal market, e.g. because the subject-matter was within an area of national rather than EU competence, a less strict approach was generally adopted. Here, the test was the “manifestly inappropriate” one above.
• In the present case, the question was whether the Legal Services Board had established that the objectives pursued by the scheme (namely the protection of recipients of the services and the sound administration of justice) could not be attained by means of a less restrictive scheme. On that basis, the Board’s bringing into force of the QASA was proportionate.

R (on the application of Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41, 24 June 2015

The ECJ has given its judgment in a case concerning the fulfilment of obligations entailed by Community transit procedures. Community transit is a customs procedure allowing the movement of goods that are not in free circulation, i.e., non-EU goods that have not been cleared into the EU, between two points in the EU under suspension of customs duties.

DSV, a Danish transport and logistics undertaking, initiated external Community transit procedures for some goods from Copenhagen (Denmark) to Jönköping (Sweden). The goods were not accepted by the consignee in Jönköping and were then returned to Copenhagen, without having been presented to either the Jönköping or Copenhagen customs offices. DSV argued that the goods were included in a later transit procedure which was correctly discharged, whereas the Danish authorities disputed this. The Danish authorities sought to establish that DSV had incurred a customs debt under Article 203 or, in the alternative, Article 204 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, as amended, (the “Customs Code”) and denied DSV the right to deduct the import VAT it had to pay on the goods.

The Court ruled that if it could not be established that the two transit procedures concerned the same goods, then a customs debt is incurred under Article 203, because the goods would be regarded as removed from customs supervision, having never been presented to the customs authority. If on the other hand, the two transit procedures did concern the same goods, the mere fact that the goods were not presented to either the customs office of destination or at origin as part of the first transit procedure is insufficient to constitute removal from customs supervision if it is established that the same goods were subsequently transported again to their destination under a second, correctly discharged transit procedure. Accordingly no customs debt would be incurred under Article 203 and Article 204 would need to be considered instead.

Article 204 concerns customs debts incurred through the failure to fulfil obligations generated by transit procedures. The relevant question regarding Article 204 was whether the late presentation of the goods at the customs office constituted an omission leading to a customs debt being incurred. The Court ruled that it did on the basis of its previous case-law. The instant case was also distinguishable from situations where an authorised consignor had, by mistake, generated two external transit procedures for one and the same consignment of goods – in any event DSV, did not make the dispatches as authorised consignor – or where the goods at issue were never transported under the first transit procedure. However, it was also necessary to consider Article 356(3) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implantation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92, as amended, (the “Implementing Regulation”), which provides that a carrier or principal is deemed to have complied with the prescribed time limit where the failure to comply is explained to the satisfaction of the customs office of destination and which is beyond the carrier’s or principal’s control. It was for the referring court to ascertain whether this was the case. Alternatively, the negative conditions in Article 204 of the Customs Code exclude a customs debt being incurred where the “failures have no significant effect on the correct operation of the temporary storage or customs procedure in question”. Article 859 of the Implementing Regulation gives an exhaustive list of the situations likely to satisfy that condition. Again, this is a matter for the referring court. Of particular interest in these proceedings were the requirement that there should not be obvious negligence and that the goods should be presented at the destination office within a reasonable time.

Lastly, the Court ruled that Article 168(e) of the VAT Directive did not preclude national legislation excluding the deduction of import VAT by the carrier of goods who is neither the importer nor owner of the goods in question.

Case C‑187/14 Skatteministeriet v DSV Road A/S (Danske Speditører), 25 June 2015

The Court of Appeal has offered useful guidance on the issues-based approach to costs orders and on determining the joint liability of partnerships.

The claimant brought a claim against a property partnership. One of the two partners had acted in breach of his fiduciary duties. The question was whether both partners were jointly and severally liable in respect of the partner’s breach of fiduciary duties. The claimant had also brought a negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal found joint and several liability and ruled as follows:

• Following Dubai Aluminium Co Limited v Salaam & Ors [2003] 2 AC 366, authority was not the touchstone for partnership liability. The touchstone was the connection between the wrongful conduct and the acts the partner was authorised to do, and in particular whether the wrongful conduct may fairly and properly be regarded as done by the partner while acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership. As the partner in breach of fiduciary duties had been carrying out the work for which the partnership had been contracted, he had been acting in the course of the partnership’s business. However, the negligence claim against the partnership failed.
• The judge had adopted an issues-based approach to costs. However, this approach did not achieve a fair balance between the claimant’s overall success and its failure on the negligence issue. The starting point should be that the successful party was entitled to its costs, and success was generally indicated by which party had to pay money to the other. In all the circumstances, the justice of the case was met by an award to the claimant of 50% of its costs of the action and the appeal, to be borne jointly and severally by the defendants.

The Northampton Regional Livestock Centre Company Ltd v Cowling and another [2015] EWCA Civ 651, 30 June 2015

The EU Commission has recently launched a European-wide study on the service of documents in EU Member States.

The study is being carried out by a consortium led by the University of Florence, the University of Uppsala and DMI, a French consulting firm. The Commission is particularly interested in understanding the existing disparities between the national regimes on service of documents that might constitute an obstacle to the proper functioning of Regulation 1393/2007 on the service of documents. The focus of the study is on domestic service of documents.

Those who wish to participate can answer an online questionnaire or download a copy.